Index.

	Page
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Statement	2
Argument	3
Conclusion	6

Table of Cases.

Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U. S. 321, 29 Sup. Ct. 106, 53 L. ed. 202	3
Woodford v. Thellusson, 4 Ves. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117; 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng Rep. 1030	4

Legal Articles.

Simes, Statutory Restrictions on the Accumulation of Income (1940) 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 409	5
54 Harv. L. Rev. 839 (1941)	6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1941.

No. 977.

ANNA LALOR BURDICK, ET AL., *Petitioners*,

v.

CHARLES LALOR BURDICK AND CHEMICAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEES, ET AL.

BRIEF OF CHARLES LALOR BURDICK AND CHEMICAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEES, IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia is reported in 33 F. Supp. 921 (R. 80).

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is reported in 123 F. (2d) 924 (R. 136).

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was entered November 26, 1941 (R. 136). The petition for certiorari was filed February 25, 1942. Jurisdiction is conferred by Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code.

Statement

Willard A. Lalor died October 9, 1934, domiciled in the District of Columbia and leaving a will which is the subject of this suit. The testator was unmarried. He left his personal effects, jewelry, furniture, works of art, and articles of a similar nature to his only living brother and sister, to be distributed by them as they might deem best. He then left $400,000 in trust for the establishment of two educational foundations. The residue was left in trust for the benefit of his nearest relatives and five old friends. $1,500 was to be paid annually to each of the friends of the testator. $6,000 was to be paid annually to his brother, and a like amount of $6,000 annually to his sister. An annuity was also left to each nephew and niece, to increase as they grew older up to a maximum of $6,000 annually. Children of nephews and nieces were to take the place of their parents in receiving the annuities. Income beyond that necessary to pay the annuities was to be reinvested by the trustees for the benefit of the trust fund. The trust was to last until twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of two of the nieces, and the principal with accumulated income was then to be distributed among the nephews and nieces or their descendants per stirpes (R. 12-18).

After payment of the annuities, $305,237.93 excess income had been accumulated during the period from the death of the testator on October 9, 1934, to January 1, 1940 (R. 102), and the District Court found that using the life expectancy of the annuitants, the average rate of income "as of the

present time" (July 3, 1940), and the average rate of annuity payments, the principal of the trust at the time of distribution should amount to at least $10,800,000* (R. 103).

The petitioners Anna Lalor Burdick, et al., are the brother, sister, nephews and nieces of the testator. They contend that the provision for accumulation of income is contrary to public policy, invalid and void. The United States Court of Appeals, however, held that the provision was valid.

Argument

The case presents no question of general importance. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is that a provision in the will of Willard A. Lalor for the accumulation and reinvestment of income from personal property during lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter is valid *in the District of Columbia,* but this decision need not be followed in any of the forty-eight states. A decision on the point by this Court would have no wider application. The law of the District of Columbia would be determined, but each state would still have its own law on the point. There is no Federal law of wills.

Nor is the case one where the United States Court of Appeals has failed to give effect to applicable decisions of this Court. On the contrary the decision is directly in accord with the view of this Court as expressed in *Fitchie* v. *Brown,* 211 U. S. 321, 29 Sup. Ct. 106, 53 L. ed. 202 (1908). There the testator, a resident of Hawaii, had created a trust "for as long a period as is legally possible, the termination or ending of said trust to take place when the law requires

*There is, of course, no assurance that the average rate of income will be maintained, and the present trend of interest rates would indicate the contrary. Perhaps the testator was very wise in creating a cushion of excess income to make more certain that the annuities would always be paid.

it under the statute." The trust estate consisted of personalty and realty. Legacies to a number of persons did not exhaust the income, so that an annual accumulation was involved. The Court held that the trust was valid for a period of twenty-one years after the death of the surviving annuitant saying:

> "Our first inquiry is, Was this trust valid as a whole? It is conceded by all that the common law is applicable, and that there is no statute in Hawaii governing the subject, except the statute making the common law applicable there, and that the utmost extent of a trust at common law is limited by lives in being at its creation and for twenty-one years thereafter; * * *". (P. 329.)

The United States Court of Appeals discussed the famous English case of *Woodford* v. *Thellusson*, 4 Ves. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117; 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030, which sustained the validity of such a provision for accumulation, and the decision in *Fitchie* v. *Brown*, *supra*. It cited a large number of texts and decisions which supported the proposition that accumulations of income are permitted at common law for twenty-one years after lives in being. The Court then stated:

> "In view of the common understanding, and the judicial acceptance including this Court (albeit not in fully discussed direct holdings) of a rule permitting accumulations for as long as the period of the rule against perpetuities, we have no hesitation in saying that has been the common law of this country and of this jurisdiction" (R. 148, 149).

But the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not rest its decision wholly on the common law. The Court considered the contention of the petitioners that the principle involved should be reexamined. The Court noted that, although the problem had existed for a century and a half, only thirteen states had placed statutory limits on accumulation. It pointed out that these statutes

had not been uniform, that there was a serious question as to whether the statutory changes represented any improvement, and that in the absence of a local statute there was no guide whereby the Court could determine what rule to establish if the common law rule was to be abandoned. What limit should be set to the amount of the accumulation? Should it apply to realty, or personalty, or both? For what period should accumulations be held good or bad? Should an illegal accumulation be held bad in whole or only as to the excess? What exception might be adopted? On these points the Court found that the statutes varied widely, and the Court concluded that if there was to be any change in the period for accumulation permitted at common law such change should be accomplished by a statute, definite in its terms and prospective in its operation. The Court concluded;

> "* * * It is, moreover, highly dubious whether size should be relevant in the courts on the issue of good or bad accumulations. In keeping with the general attitude of the law which for the most part avoids such distinctions, none of the states have made size relevant in their legislative action. * * * This trust, moreover, directs that the income is to be reinvested. This trust estate is no Fort Knox. We are not prepared to say how much better or worse is the use of this money by a trustee to buy a security than by an heir or beneficiary to purchase a topcoat."
>
> * * *
>
> "Under the accepted, established common law to date, this accumulation is good. Even though the common law is organic, the rule for this case should not be changed. Only 13 states have seen fit to change that rule by statute. The changes have not been uniform. There is a serious question as to whether the changes represent any improvement.[51] Changing the rule by holding the accumulation in this case bad would not make for an orderly improvement in our law. Any change made in the rule for accumulations should be correlated to other problems and periods in future in-

[51] Simes, Statutory Restrictions on the Accumulation of Income (1940) 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 409.

terests.[52] A court does not have as good facilities to study these problems, nor does it represent as directly the people, as the legislative body. We therefore hold the accumulation provision of this testamentary disposition valid."

[52] 54 Harv. L. Rev. 839 (1941). (R. 153, 154.)

Conclusion

It is therefore prayed that the petition for certiorari be denied. The case presents no question of Federal law. The effect of the decision is local to the District of Columbia. The decision is in accordance with the holding of this Court in *Fitchie* v. *Brown, supra,* and with established common law. It is correct in principle.

Respectfully submitted,

DALLAS S. TOWNSEND,
GARDNER DUGALD HOWIE,
SPENCER GORDON,
Attorneys for Respondents.

(16)

Office - Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
MAR 16 1942
CHARLES ELMORE CROPLEY
CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1941

No. 977

ANNA LALOR BURDICK, THOMAS JEFFERSON LALOR, CHARLES LALOR BURDICK, THOMAS MORTON LALOR, MARGARET LALOR CARY, RUTH LALOR OLSON, AND ESTHER LALOR GUTH,
Petitioners,

vs.

CHARLES LALOR BURDICK AND CHEMICAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEES, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GEORGE C. GERTMAN, GUARDIAN AD LITEM, IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING OF PETITION.

GEORGE C. GERTMAN,
Counsel for Respondent.

INDEX.

	Page
Cases:	
Colonial Trust Co. v. *Brown*, 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555	5
Dahlgren v. *Pierce*, 270 Fed. 507 (certiorari denied, 256 U. S. 682, and appeal dismissed, 692)	7
Fitchie v. *Brown*, 211 U. S. 321, 53 L. Ed. 202, 29 Sup. Ct. 106	2
Funk v. *United States*, 290 U. S. 371	2
Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. *Chicago, M. & St. Paul Railway Co.*, 175 U. S. 91, 44 L. Ed. 84	8
Palms v. *Palms*, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N. W. 419	9
Shelton v. *King*, 229 U. S. 90, 33 Sup. Ct. 686, 690, 57 L. Ed. 1086	7
Swann v. *Swann*, 21 Fed. 299	8
Texts:	
Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.), Vol. 3, s. 1156	7
Page on Wills (2d Ed.), Vol. 2, ss. 1023, 1024, 1106	7
Statute:	
1901 D. C. Code, s. 1023	5

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1941

No. 977

ANNA LALOR BURDICK, THOMAS JEFFERSON LALOR, CHARLES LALOR BURDICK, THOMAS MORTON LALOR, MARGARET LALOR CARY, RUTH LALOR OLSON, AND ESTHER LALOR GUTH,

Petitioners,

vs.

CHARLES LALOR BURDICK AND CHEMICAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEES, ET AL.

OPPOSITION OF GEORGE C. GERTMAN, GUARDIAN AD LITEM, TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

The Guardian *ad litem* appears pursuant to the authority vested in him by order entered December 6, 1938 (R. 29) and subsequent orders entered April 22 and April 29, 1940 (R. 61, 62) whereby he was appointed to represent infant defendants named in the supplemental complaint.

1. The case stated by the petitioners presents no question of general importance to the public. The Court of Appeals followed the testamentary law as established by the Courts of this Country and England for a century and a half and

it did not ignore the only applicable decision of this Honorable Court which is *Fitchie* v. *Brown*, 211 U. S. 321, 53 L. Ed. 202, 29 S. Ct. 106. The case of *Funk* v. *United States*, 290 U. S. 371, upon which petitioners rely, deals with the subject of criminal law procedure and the common law applicable thereto and not with the subject of Wills or trusts.

Willard A. Lalor who was the brother of petitioners Anna Lalor Burdick and Thomas Jefferson Lalor and the uncle of petitioners Charles Lalor Burdick, Thomas Morton Lalor, Margaret Lalor Cary, Ruth Lalor Olson and Esther Lalor Guth, died on October 9, 1934, possessed of an estate worth approximately $2,500,000.

By his Will (R. 9-18), probated in the District of Columbia, he gave outright $400,000 for educational purposes, and what was left, $2,001,646.92 (R. 3, 34), went to his trustees in trust to be administered under Article Fifth of the Will, viz:

> "Fifth—All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever nature and wheresoever situated, of which I shall be seized and possessed or to which I shall in any way be entitled at the time of my death, I give, devise and bequeath to my Trustee hereinafter named, In Trust Nevertheless, to invest, reinvest and keep the same invested for the period of twenty-one (21) years after the death of both my nieces, Esther Lalor and Ruth Lalor, and during such trust period to collect, recover and receive the issues, income, interest and profits thereof, and after deducting the commissions of the Trustee and the proper and necessary expenses of the administration of the trust, to make payments from the same in quarterly installments of equal amount as follows, viz:
>
> (Then follow the provisions for payment of annuities to relatives and friends.)
>
> "Upon the expiration of the period of twenty-one (21) years after the date upon which the survivor of my

said nieces, Esther Lalor and Ruth Lalor shall have died, this trust shall terminate and my Trustee shall forthwith assign, transfer and pay over the principal and accumulations of said trust fund, or the property into which the same may have been converted, or the proceeds thereof, as follows, viz:

"J—To my nephew, Charles Lalor Burdick, one-fifth (1/5) thereof, and if he be then deceased, to his lawful issue per stirpes and not per capita.

"K—To my nephew, Thomas Morton Lalor, one-fifth (1/5) thereof, and if he be then deceased, to his lawful issue per stirpes and not per capita.

"L—To my niece, Margaret Lalor Cary, one-fifth (1/5) thereof, and if she be then deceased, to her lawful issue per stirpes and not per capita.

"M—To the lawful issue per stirpes and not per capita of my niece, Ruth Lalor, one-fifth (1/5) thereof.

"N—To the lawful issue per stirpes and not per capita of my niece Esther Lalor, the remaining one-fifth (1/5) thereof.

"O—In the event that any of my nieces and nephews hereinbefore mentioned shall die leaving no lawful issue her or him surviving, then her or his one-fifth (1/5) share shall be divided equally among my surviving nieces and nephews above named and the lawful issue of any deceased niece or nephew above named, per stirpes and not per capita."

During their administration of the trust estate, the trustees have each year paid the annuities to testator's relatives and friends. This year, according to computation, the annuities payable to the testator's relatives are:

Anna Lalor Burdick, sister	$6,000
Thomas Jefferson Lalor, brother	6,000
Charles Lalor Burdick, nephew	5,000
Thomas Morton Lalor, nephew	3,000
Margaret Lalor Cary, niece	3,000
Ruth Lalor Olson, niece	2,000
Esther Lalor Guth, niece	2,000

Of course, as the nieces and nephews advance in years, their annuities will correspondingly increase until each receives $6,000, when the total annuities to relatives and friends will be $49,500 or about half of the present income of the trust estate.

The balance of the accrued income has been reinvested and added to the corpus of the trust estate as directed by the Will. It is this accumulated balance and the surplus income of the trust estate to be earned in the future that petitioners seek to obtain—contrary to the *expressed* intention of the testator.

2. After administering the trust for several months, the trustees on December 23, 1936 filed the original complaint (R. 1-9) mainly to have the Court instruct them whether the testator's direction to reinvest and accumulate the surplus income for the duration of the trust was valid; the main purpose of the supplemental complaint (R. 56-59) was to have the Court instruct them whether the whole of Article Fifth was valid.

The Guardian did not join in the prayers for construction of the Will nor agree that this is a case of first impression. Instead, in his answer to the original complaint (R. 33-39), the Guardian ad litem said:

> (a) "It is no part of the duty of a trustee to lead an attack upon the validity of a Will or any part thereof. The trustee represents the dead and while it is necessary and proper that he should fully state the points of difficulty, the same reasons which cast upon him the responsibility of procuring and defending the probate of the Will at the cost of the estate, require him to assume no position of actual hostility to what may appear to have been the intention of the testator."
>
> (b) "The first question presented to the Court by the trustees' bill of complaint is whether the provisions of the Will for the accumulation of the unused income of the estate are valid. This question is answered affirmatively by the Supreme Court of the United States

in Fitchie *v.* Brown, 211 U. S. 321. See also Moeller *v.* Kautz, 112 Conn. 481."

On the other hand, the petitioners, both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals, took the position that Article Fifth violated Sec. 1023, 1901 D. C. Code, and for that reason it was invalid (R. 120). Sec. 1023, which is a part of the public policy of the District of Columbia (see *Colonial Trust Co.* v. *Brown,* 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555), is as follows:

> "Perpetuities.—Except in the case of gifts or devises to charitable uses, every future estate, whether of freehold or leasehold, whether by way of remainder or without a precedent estate, and whether vested or contingent, shall be void in its creation which shall suspend, or may by possibility suspend, the power of absolute alienation of the property, so that there shall be no person or persons in being by whom an absolute fee in the same, in possession, can be conveyed, for a longer period than during the continuance of not more than one or more lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter."

Disposing of the question raised by the supplemental complaint, the District Court adjudged that Article Fifth did not violate Sec. 1023 of the 1901 D. C. Code, and that it was therefore valid (R. 107). From this part of the decree the petitioners perfected an appeal (R. 120, 121). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court upon this phase of the case (R. 137-142) and the petitioners have abandoned their contention regarding it.

However, in adjudicating the question raised by the original complaint, the District Court held (R. 108) the provisions of Article Fifth directing the reinvestment and accumulation of the surplus income invalid and ordered payment of the surplus income, both accumulated and hereafter accruing, to the testator's next of kin *as intestate property.* The Guardian ad litem promptly noted and perfected an appeal (R. 108-111) which the petitioners unsuc-

cessfully attempted to have dismissed (R. 123). Thereafter the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court upon this phase of the litigation (R. 142-154) and it is this part of the decision which petitioners now seek to have reviewed.

The Will, in its entirety, therefore stands before this Honorable Court unimpeached and perfect and valid in every respect, and the trustees stand instructed accordingly.

(NOTE.—The guardian ad litem observes a mistake in the mandate (R. 155) and in due course will proceed to have it corrected to conform with the decision of the Court of Appeals so as to order the affirmance in part and reversal in part of the appealed decree.)

3. If the petitioners' contention is sound that it is wrong socially, ethically and economically to permit a man to direct that upon his death the income of his estate shall be withheld from the next living generation, and be accumulated for a period as long as lives in being and twenty-one years, then they should be public spirited enough to petition the Legislature, as was done in thirteen States, to reform the law permitting it to be done. But the Court is not the forum by which to obtain the *post mortem* reform.

In the Thellusson case it was said by the Master of the Rolls a century and a half ago that—

> "The Judges are to declare the law, not to make the law. If any inconvenience arises, the Legislature, not the Judges must apply the remedy."

It cannot be said that in the year 1908 it was wrong socially, ethically and economically for a testator to do what Lalor did because in that year this Court itself, in *Fitchie* v. *Brown*, declared that inasmuch as Galbraith, whose Will was before the Court for construction, did not himself provide for the reinvestment and accumulation of the surplus income of the trust estate, the law would do it for him. The exact language of the Court being—

> "The Will shows that the testator supposed that there would be such surplus. Should it be accumulated or paid to the heirs of testator? We think the surplus, after paying annuities, must accumulate as part of the trust estate until the time arrives for the distribution of that estate, and that such accumulation must then be distributed as a part thereof to those who would then have the right to take the estate as provided for in the Will."

When Lalor made his Will, presumably he knew the law established by *Fitchie* v. *Brown* and by the Circuit Court of Appeals in *Dahlgren* v. *Pierce,* 270 Fed. 507 (certiorari denied, 256 U. S. 682, and appeal dismissed, 692), where, after discussing *Fitchie* v. *Brown,* the Court said—

> "In trusts for accumulation, the entire income may be tied up and paid to no one, provided the final period of vesting or distribution does not violate this rule against perpetuities. This is so obvious that it is assumed as the starting point of all discussions whether particular trusts for accumulation are good."
>
> See also Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.), Vol. 3, s. 1156; Page on Wills (2d Ed.), Vol. 2, ss. 1023, 1024, 1106.

It is nowhere alleged in the petition that Lalor, in making his Will, disobeyed the rule against perpetuities, the rule against restraint of alienation of property, any statutes or any established common law principle, nor that he ran counter to any decision of the Court, consequently it becomes the duty of the Court, as was said in *Shelton* v. *King,* 229 U. S. 90, 33 Sup. Ct. 686, 690, 57 L. Ed. 1086, to carry out the provisions of the Will; the exact language of the Court being—

> "There is no higher duty which rests upon a court than to carry out the intentions of a testator when the provision is not repugnant to settled principles of public policy and is otherwise valid."

The petitioners also contend that public policy condemns such accumulation and that the surplus income should be allowed to go, *as intestate property,* to the next of kin instead of in the channel directed by the testator, but they nowhere point out that there is anything expressed in the Organic Act, statutes, judicial decisions of the Courts, or in any established principle of the common law applicable to testamentary documents which is opposed or hostile to the enforcement of the testator's Will.

This Court and other Courts, however, have pointed out the sources of information to which Courts must look to determine the public policy of a State, namely, the Constitution, laws and judicial decisions.

In *Hartford Fire Insurance Co.* v. *Chicago M. & St. Paul Railway Co.,* 175 U. S. 91, 44 L. Ed. 84, which affirmed 70 Fed. 201, the Court had before it for decision the question of what constituted the public policy of a State regarding *acts done,* and there Mr. Justice Gray said—

> "Questions of public policy as affecting the liability for acts done, or upon contracts made and to be performed, within one of the states of the Union,—when not controlled by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or by the principles of the commercial or mercantile law or of general jurisprudence, of national or universal application,—are governed by the law of the states as expressed in its own Constitution and statutes, or declared by its highest Court." (Citations.)

And in *Swann* v. *Swann,* 21 Fed. 299, the Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking upon the subject of public policy, said—

> "Vague surmises and flippant assertions as to what is the public policy of the state, or what would be shocking to the moral sense of its people, are not to be indulged in. The law points out the sources of information to which courts must appeal to determine the public policy of a state. The term, as it is often popularly

> used and defined, makes it an unknown and variable quantity,—much too indefinite and uncertain to be made the foundation of a judgment. The only authentic and admissible evidence of the public policy of a state on any given subject are its constitution, laws and judicial decisions. The public policy of a state, of which courts take notice, and to which they give effect, must be deduced from these sources."

Notwithstanding the law thus pronounced, and regardless of the effect upon the Wills of other deceased people where smaller or larger trust estates are involved, the petitioners seek a *post mortem* ruling by this Honorable Court that the testator's Will transgresses public policy because of the size of the accumulations, assuming continuance of the present status. But the law does not concern itself with the size of the estate or the amount involved, consequently Lalor's Will must be considered and tested as any other Will without reference to the amount it bequeaths or places in the hands of the trustees. Speaking upon this subject, the Court in *Palms* v. *Palms,* 68 Mich. 355, 36 N. W. 419, said—

> "The various questions presented to the court by the bill in this cause were ably and elaborately argued before us by counsel of eminence and ability, but it seems to me that the solution of the main question does not involve many of the questions discussed before us. And the case, in my opinion, does not depend at all upon the amount of money involved or the magnitude of the estate. If it be true that the accumulation of a great fortune by a single individual is a public misfortune and against public policy, yet, nevertheless, the power to govern that fortune and direct its course after the death of the owner, by ante mortem disposition, under our laws and the policy of our institutions is identical with the authority of the poorer man to dispose by will of the few hundred dollars that he may have saved during his lifetime. The law in this regard knows, and should know, no difference between the rich and the

poor. Indeed, it could make no distinction of this kind without special legislation, contrary to our institutions and the theory of our government.

"The Will of Francis Palms must, then, in the outset, be considered and tested as any other Will would be, without reference to the amount it bequeaths or places in the hands of trustees. Much of the argument of counsel has been directed to theories and purposes of government as regards the accumulation and holding of vast estates which, though correct in the abstract, in my opinion have no place in this discussion, and can and should have no influence whatever in determining the validity of the trust or trusts contained in this Will. If this Will would be valid if only one hundred dollars was involved it must also be valid if it disposes of ten millions. It is the wise and beneficent purpose of the courts, if possible, to uphold and sustain Wills when there is no doubt whatever of the sanity and perfect competency of the testators to make them, and that they were executed without duress or any undue influence."

If it be true in the face of cited decisions that the Court, *post mortem*, may strike down as invalid the accumulation clause of Lalor's Will because of the size of the amount involved, then the question arises: For how long might Lalor direct and control the accumulation of surplus income if the measure of time is not governed by the rule against perpetuites?

Accordingly, it is the Guardian ad litem's duty to oppose the granting of the prayer of the petition and to ask for its denial.

Respectfully,

GEORGE C. GERTMAN,
Guardian ad Litem,
730 15th Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.